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Households in many poor, agrarian economies derive their income from rain-dependent
agriculture. This dependence raises the possibility that, from rainfall patterns early on
in the crop-cycle, households accumulate information about future cash inflows (e.g.,
harvests) before the cashflows are realized. Using detailed longitudinal data from three
villages in India, this paper explores whether households utilize this information in the
ways suggested by modern consumption theories. Two of the central hypotheses sug-
gested by these theories are that households are forward-looking in their consumption
behavior and react optimally to the receipt of information; and that in the face of un-
certainty about future incomes, households engage in precautionary saving. The basic
challenge in implementing tests of these hypotheses has been to find empirical measures
of the "news" that households receive, and the uncertainty they face. I show that, in
the villages I study, rainfall patterns provide good proxies from which such measures
might be constructed. I exploit this fact to test for precautionary saving and forward-
looking behavior. I find that precautionary saving and forward-looking behavior do
not, by themselves, fully explain the observed consumption patterns. However, when I
explicitly incorporate the possibility of binding borrowing constraints into the testing
strategy, I obtain fairly strong support for the joint hypothesis of precautionary saving
and forward-looking behavior in the presence of borrowing constraints.
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1. Introduction
Modern consumption theories emphasize the role of information accumulation and uncer-
tainty in determining consumption patterns. Two of the central hypotheses suggested by
these theories are first, that households are forward-looking in their consumption behavior
and react immediately to the receipt of information about future income; and second, that
in the face of uncertainty about future incomes, households engage in precautionary sav-
ing.1 Whether households do in fact behave in the ways suggested, and the extent to which
they do so, has implications for a number of macroeconomic policy issues, from the likely
efficacy of various fiscal measures to the determinants of savings rates. A large number of
papers over the last two decades have used household-level data to explore the empirical
validity of these hypotheses.2 The primary challenge has been to find empirical measures
of the "news" that households receive, and the "uncertainty" they face. With the sort of
household-level data that are usually available for the U.S. and other developed economies,
convincing proxies have been hard to find.
The basic idea of this paper is that in poor, agrarian economies, where households derive
their incomes from rain-dependent agricultural cultivation, good proxies may be constructed
from data on rainfall patterns. Agricultural cultivation is a lengthy time-consuming process,
drawn out over several months, and especially in rainfed areas, is subject to a variety of
rainfall-related weather shocks at each stage of the crop-cycle. The dependence on rainfall
raises the possibility that from rainfall patterns early on in the crop cycle, households may
accumulate information about future cashflows (e.g., harvests) months before the cashflows
are actually realized. For instance, the late arrival of monsoon rains (in June) might imply
(everything else equal) poorer harvests (and hence, lower incomes) in December. If so, the
late arrival of the monsoon conveys news (in this case, bad) about future incomes that
forward-looking households ought to respond to, by adjusting their consumptions in June
itself. Moreover, because, by definition, the arrival of news implies the resolution of at least
some uncertainty, intertemporal and cross-sectional variation in the timing and volume of
rainfall should capture some of the uncertainty faced by agrarian households. Thus, data
on rainfall patterns, in principle, provide good—good, in the sense that they are observable,
exogenous and vary over time and locations—empirical proxies for the "news" that house-
holds receive and the "uncertainty" they face. I implement this idea using longitudinal
household data and rainfall data from three villages in India. I show that rainfall patterns
do indeed provide good proxies for measures of news and uncertainty and exploit this fact
to test for precautionary saving and forward-looking behavior.
Beyond providing a potentially clean test, this exercise is of independent interest. The
incomes of agrarian households are notoriously volatile because of the significant year-to-
1
 Strictly speaking, households that display a precautionary motive for saving increase their savings in
response to increased uncertainty about their future consumption prospects. Except in some pathological
cases, uncertainty about future income will translate directly into uncertainty about future consumption.
Note also that risk-aversion, by itself, does not imply precautionary saving. Kimball (1990) explores the
distinction between risk-aversion and precautionary saving behavior.
Browning and Lusardi (1996) provide a very useful survey of this literature.
year fluctuations in rainfall in many parts of the world. Such volatility can, in the absence
of insurance markets or other risk-sharing arrangements, impose significant welfare costs
on these households and this has long been a source of concern for policymakers. A large
literature has emerged over the last two decades examining the coping mechanisms poor,
agrarian households use to deal with this volatility.3 This paper is also a contribution to
that literature.
In the next section, I document the seasonality and volatility of incomes in the three
villages. I also show that, in these villages, rainfall patterns provide information about
future cash infllows before the cashflows are realized. Section 3 lays out the theoretical im-
plications of informational accumulation for consumption behavior. The empirical strategy
I pursue is described in Section 4. In Section 5 I present and discuss the results of the tests
of forward-looking behavior. The results and discussion of the tests of precautionary saving
are in Section 6. I find that precautionary saving and forward-looking behavior do not, by
themselves, fully explain the observed consumption patterns. But when the testing strategy
is modified to take into account the possibility of borrowing constraints, the modified tests
provide fairly strong evidence in favor of the joint hypothesis of forward-looking behavior
and precautionary saving in the presence of borrowing constraints. Section 7 concludes.
2. Income seasonality and the accumulation of information
2.1. The data and the environment
The data I use come from the Village-Level-Studies (VLS) longitudinal household surveys
carried out by the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, based
in Hyderabad, India. Started in 1975, the VLS surveys initially covered six villages in three
broad agro-climactic zones within the semi-arid region of India (i.e., south-central India).
Three of the villages were dropped after 1980 at which time the survey was extended to
four new villages. Routine data collection was discontinued in all villages after 1985. Daily
rainfall data were, however, collected up to 1990. The cross-sectional coverage of the surveys
is limited—forty households in each village. But the surveys provide detailed data on prac-
tically all aspects of production, consumption and asset-holdings of the sample households.
Walker and Ryan (1990) provide extensive socio-economic profiles of the sample villages,
a wealth of institutional, environmental and historical detail, as well as a comprehensive
summary of the many findings of the surveys.
I use the data from the three villages—Aurepalle in the state of Andhra Pradesh, and
Shirapur and Kanzara in the state of Maharashtra—that were covered continuously between
1975 and 1985. However, due to concerns about reliability, I do not use the data from the
first and last years (1975-76 and 1984-85) of the survey. Also, because the coverage of
consumption expenditures was reduced after 1981-82, I only use the consumption data
from the six years 1976-77 to 1981-82. Finally, I exclude any landless households from my
sample. This leaves about thirty or so households in each of the three villages.
The primary source of income in all three villages is agricultural cultivation, which,
because the villages are in rainfed areas where irrigation is relatively rare, is dependent on
3The survey chapter by Besley (1995) and the symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Case
(1995) provide nice overviews of this literature.
the southwest monsoon rains. The agricultural crop cycle is therefore governed by rainfall
patterns that are highly seasonal. The monsoon rains typically begin in early June and
recede by mid-October. Figure (1) plots the average (over the period 1975-1990) monthly
rainfall in each of the three villages. In Aurepalle and Kanzara, the main crop is planted
with the onset of the monsoon. Harvesting begins in late September for short-duration
crops and continues till the following March for longer-duration crops. Some households
plant a second crop during the winter months that is harvested between March and May.
In Shirapur, crops are typically planted after the monsoon and harvested in the first few
months of the following calendar year.
I next establish some basic properties of household income in these villages where income
is defined as the sum of profits from agricultural cultivation and net inflows from other ac-
tivities including off-farm agricultural labor, animal husbandry and trades and handicrafts.
For this purpose, and for the subsequent analysis, I divide the crop year into three seasons—
the monsoon season (M) from June to September, the winter season (W) from October to
January, and the summer season (S) from February to May. Table (1) presents an analysis
of variance of seasonal income. Household and agricultural year effects are evident, but the
main source of variation is seasonal. Figure (2) plots the season effects in income in the
three villages. Incomes are highest during the main harvest period, which for Aurepalle and
Kanzara is during the winter, and for Shirapur, during the summer. Incomes are lowest in
all three villages during the monsoon.
The pronounced seasonality of income is accompanied in these villages by significant
volatility in incomes from year to year. Table (2) displays the cross-sectional average,
by season and village, of the (intertemporal) coefficient of variation of income for each
household over the eight years of the panel. The average coefficient of variation ranges
from 0.45 for monsoon season income in Kanzara to 1.27 for monsoon income in Shirapur.
Incomes are clearly quite volatile from year to year.4 The dependence of agricultural incomes
on rainfall, however, raises the possibility that, within the crop year, the volatility is partially
anticipated—i.e., that, from rainfall patterns early on in the crop cycle, households are
able to accumulate information about future cashflows (e.g., harvests) months before the
cashflows are actually realized.5
2.2. Do rainfall-related weather shocks convey information about future income?
To explore this possibility I begin by positing the following process for the income of a
household h in season j of crop-year t:6
Yhtj = Xhtaj + Khtp + Ej=1/2«7j + ^=1(Kht ® Rti)4 + S J r ^ e ^ + ehtj (2.1)
4
 Note, from the first column of Table (2), that the coefficient of variation of annual income is lower than
that of income in any one season, which suggests that within the agricultural year, seasonal incomes tend
to be negatively correlated. This may reflect variation in the timing of income receipts from year to year,
or it may be due, as Kochar (1995) suggests, to household-level efforts to smooth income ex-post through,
for instance, adjustments in labor supply. Still, even the volatility of annual income is high.
5
 For instance, the late arrival of the monsoon rains in June may signal poorer harvests during the winter
season.
6 From here on I use {1,2,3} and {M, W, S} interchangeably to index seasons.
Here Xht and Kht are vectors of the household's characteristics at the beginning of crop-year
t, characteristics that capture sources of variation in Yhtj (across households and crop-years)
that are unrelated to the gradual resolution of uncertainty over the course of the crop-cycle.
Xht includes the household's total wealth, liquid assets, the age of the household head,
the schooling of the household head, and the number of adults in the household, while
Kht includes the land area owned by the household, the proportion of this area that is
irrigated, and the number of bullocks owned by the household. Ru is a vector of rainfall-
related weather shocks that are realized (and are hence assumed to enter the household's
information set) in season i, where i < j . The key assumption implicit in (2.1) is that Ru
potentially affects income, not only in season i, but also in later seasons. (Kht ® Ru) is
the vector of interactions between Kht and Ru. Lastly, ehu represents an unobservable (to
us) non-weather-related idiosyncratic shock—e.g. ill health, localized crop damage—that is
realized in season i but, again, potentially affects income in later seasons as well.
Several points need to be made about (2.1). First, note that this specification of the
seasonal income process captures the potential accumulation of information over the course
of the crop-year. This can be seen by rewriting (2.1) as:
Yhtj = XuoP + Hup + A=Ati (2-2)
where, with the normalization, (fp- = 1:
4ti = Rtrfi + (KM ® RM + 4ehu (2.3)
A household's income in season j of year t is therefore posited to be the sum of a benchmark
level—Xhtod + Khtft—determined by its characteristics at the beginning of the year, and
a series of shocks—r)Jhu, i = 1,..., j—information about which the household accumulates in
the seasons leading up to and including season j . In other words, rfhti represents the news
that the household receives in season i, where i < j , about its income in season j . The idea
here is that a household begins the crop-year with a base information set {Xht, Kht}-> which
is supplemented in each season i with information obtained as various rainfall-related (Ru)
and idiosyncratic shocks (ehu) are realized. For instance, the onset date of the monsoon
(whether it's early or late) provides the household with additional information that it uses
to update its forecasts of its income during the monsoon and later seasons. Table (3) lists all
the variables that I include in the base information set, and in each of the three subsequent
seasonal information sets.
Of course, for this interpretation (of 77^ as news) to be valid, the rainfall-related vari-
ables, Ru, must truly represent "shocks" in the sense that they are unanticipated. That
is, if £lht,i-\ denotes the household's information set in season i — 1, it must be that
E[Ru I Qht,i-i] — 0) where E[ • | Q,ht,i-i] denotes the expectations operator conditional
on flht,i-i- I confirm that that is indeed the case by testing whether the rainfall-related
variables are predictable from past weather patterns. The tests indicate the absence of both
inter-year and inter-seasonal (i.e., intra-year) correlations.
The second point to note about (2.1) is that it is a semi-reduced form representation of
the income process. The incomes of agrarian households, such as those in my sample, are
derived primarily from agricultural cultivation. Therefore, underlying the income process
is an agricultural production function that links the various input use decisions that the
household makes to the harvests that are realized. Insofar as I do not directly control for
these input choices, (2.1) is a reduced form representation of the income process. Note,
however, that this omission is deliberate because I wish to estimate the total effect of
weather-related shocks on income and that includes any effects that result from alterations
in input use in response to weather-related shocks. The specification is a semi-reduced
form one in that I do condition on Kht-7 The inclusion of Kht serves two purposes. First,
by interacting Kht with the rainfall-related variables Rt{ I am able to construct household-
specific proxies for the exogenous shocks. And second, by including Kht, I control for the
possibility that, because of factor and asset market imperfections, a household's production
decisions may be influenced by its ownership of productive assets.
The third and final point about the specification is that it assumes that the weather-
related shocks to income accumulate additively over the course of the crop-year. The signifi-
cance of this somewhat restrictive assumption (and some evidence in favor of it) is discussed
in the next section.
To test whether rainfall-related weather shocks that are realized in a particular season
contain any news about (i.e., have any power in predicting) incomes in that and later
seasons, I separately estimate (2.1) for each village and season. I deal with the fact that
ehu is not directly observable by estimating the three seasonal income processes implied by
(2.1) sequentially. I begin by estimating the monsoon season income process, which poses
no problems since e^M enters as a standard disturbance term. I then include the estimated
residual ehtM a s a proxy for ehtM in estimating the winter season income process. Finally
I estimate the summer season income process using ehtM an<i Chtw a s proxies for ehtM
Table (4) reports the results I obtained. The first two columns of each panel show the
results for the monsoon-season income process, the next two, for the winter-season income
process, and the final two columns, for the summer season income process. Shown are the
p-values from the F-tests for the joint significance of the variables—Ru, (Kht ® Rti), a n d
where applicable, ehu—that serve as proxies for news about current and future income.
The first, third, and fifth columns indicate the significance of the entire set of proxies. The
remaining columns reveal whether the household-specific proxies are significant. The two
sets of results are similar in every case but one.
Except in Aurepalle, monsoon-season rainfall surprises do not capture well the variations
in monsoon season income—see the first row and first two columns of each panel. This
primarily reflects the fact that in Shirapur and Kanzara such cashflows are rare. Monsoon-
season rainfall surprises do, however, predict summer cash inflows in all three villages—fifth
and sixth columns of the first row of each panel—and, in Aurepalle and Shirapur, provide
good proxies for shocks to winter cashflows as well—third and fourth columns of the first row
of each panel. Winter rainfall surprises are everywhere significant—though only marginally
so in Kanzara—in explaining variations in winter cash inflows (third and fourth columns
of the second row of each panel); and except in Kanzara, are also significant in predicting
In other words, (2.1), is a specification of the conditional or restricted-profit function.
8Note that Kht denotes the productive assets owned by the household entering crop-year t rather than
the assets actually allocated to production in crop-year t. The distinction is important both in theory and
in the data. For instance, the amount of land owned by a household entering a crop-year does not reflect
any information received during the crop-year whereas the amount of land cultivated by the household may.
summer income. Fluctuations in rainfall, of which there is little in all three villages during
the summer months, do nevertheless seem to explain variations in summer cashflows in
Aurepalle and Shirapur.
Overall, the results from Table (4) suggest that in the three villages in my sample,
rainfall-related weather shocks do contain news about current and future incomes, and
hence, provide good proxies from which measures of the "news" that households receive,
and the "uncertainty" they face, might be constructed. The idea of using rainfall data
to construct proxies for shocks to income in agrarian settings is certainly not a new one.
Paxson(1992) uses rainfall data to construct estimates of transitory shocks to income, while
Jacoby and Skoufias(1997, 1998) use rainfall measures as proxies for unanticipated changes
in income.9 Binswanger and Rosenzweig(1993) use measures of weather risk constructed
from rainfall data to examine the influence of weather risk and wealth on the portfolio
(productive and other assets) choices of agrarian households. The use I make of rainfall-
related variables builds upon these previous papers. First, unlike Paxson(1992) I have the
data to allow for household-specific weights on the aggregate shock (through the interaction
terms (Kht®Rtk))- Secondly, unlike Jacoby and Skoufias(1997, 1998), I use the rainfall data
to construct proxies not only for shocks to current income but also for news about future
income. And finally, whereas Rosenzweig and Binswanger(1993) looks at how weather risk
influences ex-ante investment decisions, I focus on how, conditional on the portfolio choices
they make, households adjust their consumption decisions ex-post, in response to weather
risk and weather-related shocks.
3. Implications for consumption behavior
In this section I detail the implications of information accumulation over the course of
the crop-year for the consumption behavior of households. To most easily highlight these
implications I begin by going through a simple example in which I assume that income
is exogenous, and for which a closed-form solution is available. I then highlight some
potential complications that arise because, in practice, the incomes (more correctly, profits)
of agrarian households depend on production decisions that they, themselves, make over
the course of the crop year, where these decisions are presumably influenced by any new
information that becomes available.
3.1. A simple example
Assume, as in (2.2) above, that the income that household h receives in season j of crop-year
t is given by:
Yhtj = Xhta* + Khtp + ??i=lr{hti
where Xht and Kht are vectors of household characteristics, a-7 and (33 are season-specific
weighting factors, and rfhu is defined as:
~ E[Yhtj | n ^ - i ]
Wolpin(1982) was among the first papers to use rainfall data in studying consumption behavior, though
he uses the data in a slightly different way. He exploits spatial variation in the moments of the rainfall
distribution (estimated from historical data) to instrument permanent income.
where E[.\ denotes the expectations operator and Qht,i-\ denotes the information set of
household h in season i — 1 of year t. rfhu therefore represents the revision, in season i < j ,
of the household's expectations about income in season j ; or in other words, rfhti is the
news about season j income that the household receives in season i < j . Note that implicit
in this specification of the income process is the assumption that once we control for the
benchmark characteristics of the household, information about seasonal incomes in year t
accumulates only within the year.
From the definition of rfhti it follows that:
However, it is possible, and in fact quite likely, that the news, rfhti, that the household
receives in season i about season j income may be correlated with the news, 77^, it receives
in the same season i about income in season k where i < j < k. Thus, I assume that:
EWhtirikhti I fi*M-i] = a% V/z, Vi < j < k
where aJhi is potentially non-zero and may be either negative or positive (except when j = k,
in which case it has to be positive).
Beginning in season k of crop-year s, infinitely-lived households maximize the expected




subject to the sequence of seasonal budget constraints:
CMj + AMj = Yhtj + (1 + r)Ahtj-i (3.2)
Each crop-year t has three seasons, indexed by j , and v(.) denotes the within-season utility
function. C^tj is household /i's consumption level in season j of crop-year t (denoted (t,j)),
and j3 < 1 is its subjective discount factor. A^tj is the household's asset holdings at the end
of (t,j), and r is the season-to-season rate of return on assets. The Euler equation for this
problem is the usual one, i.e.,:
j-i) = 0(1 + r)E[v'(Chtj) | Qhtj-d (3.3)
To proceed further in characterizing the consumption process, additional assumptions need
to be made. I assume that the household's preferences are described by the constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) utility function:
v(Chtj) = - - e,-eahtj
and that the various components of news that are received in season i are jointly normally
distributed:
In addition, to save on notation, I make the otherwise inessential assumption that:
1
1 + r
With these assumptions, the results of Caballero(1990) can be adapted to this seasonal
context to generate the following closed-form solution for consumption changes:
r 1
t^htj = V^htj ~ ^htj-l) — ~T~~ k=j\L + r) Vhtj ' ~^UV V^htj *>Lht,j-l\ K0-^)
Here, V[Chtj \ Qht,j-i] is the conditional variance of one-period-ahead consumption, which,
under our assumptions about the income process, is given by:
V[Chtj I OMJ.,] = (j"^:) (pLjVLjV- + ^ -"-'"hj) (3-5)
Two key implications of (3.4) are the focus of this paper. The first is that households should
be forward-looking in the sense that household consumption should respond immediately to
news about future income. This can be seen by rewriting the innovation in period {t,j)
consumption as:
The first term on the right hand side represents the influence of the shock to current income;
the second term captures the adjustment called for because of the news received in (t, j)
about incomes in later seasons.
The second implication is that households should display a precautionary motive. To
see this, take the conditional expectation of (3.4), which yields:
E[ACM, I i!Mj-i] = \eV[Cm | nMli_i] (3.6)
In other words, households should depress their consumption (i.e.,engage in precautionary
saving) in (£, j — 1) because they are uncertain about the news, T?^,-, they will receive in (t, j)
about incomes in season j and in later seasons k. What this implies is that, on average,
consumption should grow more going into periods in which a lot of uncertainty is resolved
(i.e., information is received), as measured by the conditional variance of the news that is
received.
Precautionary savings motives are usually stated in terms of households engaging in
rainy day saving in the face of uncertainty about future incomes. As (3.6) makes clear,
a more correct statement would be that the extent of precautionary saving in (t,j — 1) is
driven by the uncertainty about the news that will be received in (t,j), captured here by
the variance of the news. In general, this will differ from the unconditional variance (or the
variance conditional on the base information set) of the income that is received in (£, j),
and this distinction becomes especially important when constructing empirical proxies for
the uncertainty that households face. For instance, in this example, the variance of (t,j)
income is:
V(Yhtj) = S t ,o^
which, clearly, is not the same as the expression in (3.5). Finally, note that it is, therefore,
possible in this setting for the seasonal pattern of consumption to differ quite markedly
from the seasonal pattern of income since the seasonal pattern of consumption is driven by
the seasonal patterns in the resolution of uncertainty.
3.2. Potential complications
The example I outline above assumes a simple exogenous income process in which the shocks
to income accumulate additively over the course of the crop-year and the distribution of
these shocks is fixed over time. The assumption of exogeneity may be questioned on the
grounds that the incomes of agrarian households clearly depend on input choices that the
households themselves make over the course of the crop-year. That is to say, a more general
and realistic representation of the income process would be one where the income of a
household h in season j of crop-year t is given by:
Yhtj = F\Xht, Khu Zlt.^ 4 M < •) - Y?k=jV)Zkhtj
Here FJ(.) represents the crop revenues realized in (t,j). Crop revenues are a function of:
where Z3hti denotes the vector of inputs applied by the household in season i (where i < j)
on plots that are harvested in season j . Crop revenues also depend on:
ht,i<j = y^htv • " ' £htj>
where eJhu denotes an exogenous shock—i.e., a random variable whose expectation, con-
ditional on lagged information, is zero—that directly affects the harvest in season j but
is realized in season i < j . Finally, T^,= -p^Z^t- denotes cultivation expenditures in (t,j);
these include both expenditures on inputs applied towards the harvest in (t,j) and those
on inputs for crops to be harvested at a later date.
In each season, based on the information available to it at that point, and given its
earlier decisions, each household decides on its consumption level, Chtj and the levels of
various inputs, Zk^3 = (ZJhtj,..., Z\t3).
The question then is how this more realistic representation of the income process alters
the implications for consumption behavior that were outlined in the simple example. To
get a sense of the complications that can arise, consider a household's decision, in period
(t,j), regarding the level of input use on plots that are to be harvested in (t,j 4-1). If, as
seems quite plausible, the marginal product of the input depends on e^t. , the shock that is
realized in (t,j), the level of input use will clearly depend on e?ht. . And, by influencing the
level of input use, the realization of e^t. will, therefore, provide information on the level
of the harvest that can be expected in (t, j + 1). This type of information accumulation
is captured by the simple process assumed thus far. But if the marginal product of an
input applied in (t,j) also depends on the shock that is realized in (t,j + 1)—whether it
does or not depends on the separability properties of F^(.)—the level of input use in (t, j)
will, in addition, influence the variance of the harvest in (t,j + 1). Thus, in this setting,
the realization of a weather-related shock, e\t-, in period (t, j) may provide news not only
about the level of income but also news about the variance of income in future seasons; in
other words, the income process may be conditionally heteroskedastic.
Conceptually, this added complication does not pose any problems, because, as Ca-
ballero (1990) shows, even with a conditionally heteroskedastic income process, the basic
conclusions about how households should react to either news or the presence of uncertainty
remain. But the empirical specification of the seasonal income process I have assumed so
far, (2.1), only allows weather-related shocks to accumulate additively, which rules out the
possibility of conditional heteroskedasticity. To correct this, I extended the specification to
include interactions of the rainfall-related shocks that are realized in different seasons, or in
other words, to allow the shocks to accumulate multiplicatively. However, possibly because
the inclusion of so many additional terms reduces the already limited degrees of freedom,
none of the interaction terms were significant. Thus, the empirical strategy I outline in the
next section, and the results I report in the following two sections, are based on estimates
of the simple additive income process.
4. Empirical implementation
While the assumption of CARA preferences proved useful in highlighting the implications
of information accumulation for consumption behavior, in empirically testing these im-
plications, I adopt the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification for the utility
function. I do so because much of the more recent microeconometric consumption literature
is based on this specification, which implies:
AChti) = C^5 (4.1)
Let r denote the net seasonal return on a risk-free asset to which all households are assumed
to have access. With this assumption and (4.1), a second-order Taylor expansion of the Euler
equation (3.3) yields:
= a + -
P
where:
A hi Chtj = In Chtj - In Cht,j-i
a is a constant containing higher-order terms, V(hi Chtj I ^ht,,j-i)1S the conditional variance
of the log of one-period-ahead consumption, and ^ htj ls the adjustment to consumption that
the household makes in period (t,j). £htj 1S defined as:
£htj = \nChtj - E(1nChtj | nhtJ-i) (4.3)
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and therefore satisfies:
-i) = 0 (4.4)
The basic challenge in empirically implementing tests of forward looking behavior and
precautionary saving based on equation (4.2) is that V(£htj \ ftht,,j-i) a nd €htj a r e n°t
directly observable. Appropriate proxies for the two variables have, therefore, to be con-
structed.
With the CRRA specification there is no closed form solution available for the consump-
tion process. I, therefore, proceed based on the following approximation, which is motivated
by the CARA example:
£htj ^ \Xhtj
+sL;+i [E{Yhtk
« < - + S i J = i + 1 ^ (4-5)
In other words, I assume that the consumption innovation can be approximated by the un-
weighted sum of rfht •, the shock to season j income that is realized in season j and the news,
Tjfaj, received in season j about incomes in seasons k > j . The season-specific estimates
of (2.1) then provide natural empirical proxies for the news that households receive. For
instance, as an empirical proxy for 77^ .-, where k > j , I use:
Mhtj) — ^\Yhtk
(Kht ® Rtj)&j + faChtj
(4.6)
The other unobservable variable in equation (4.2) is V(£htj \ ftht,,j-i)- Since I proxy £htj
with:
lhtj = S|= J7)^ (4.7)
the obvious proxy for V(£htj \ Qht,,j-i) 1S the sample conditional variance of (4.7), which I
denote from now on as V(£htj
, ffhtj
In constructing the sample variances and covariances that make up the variance of (4.7), I
explicitly recognize the information structure of the model. Thus, for instance, the sample




and, for purposes of notational ease, I have ignored the fact that
vectors.
and Kht are both
11
It is worth clarifying the way in which V(£htj | flht,j-i) differs from the empirical
measures of income uncertainty used in past studies using micro-data. A typical proxy
for income uncertainty is the household-specific sample variance of the residuals from a
longitudinal regression of income on a set of covariates that capture any cross-sectional
variation. The problem with such a measure in this context is twofold. First, it is an
unconditional variance from a time-series perspective. If the covariates that capture cross-
sectional variation, K^ in this setting, vary over time, this variation would be incorrectly
included in the measure. Second, and this is the more serious problem, to the extent
that households accumulate information over the course of the crop-cycle, the measure
would overstate the uncertainty faced by the household in the preceding period. By the
same token, if households receive news about future cashflows, the variance of realized net
cashflows underestimates the uncertainty that is resolved in any given period. What enables
me to avoid these problems, as is clear from the construction of V(£htj \ Qht,j-i), is the fact
that the rainfall data provide proxies for the unanticipated intertemporally varying income
shocks.
5. Does household consumption respond to news about future income?
Forward-looking behavior on the part of households is implicit in all modern theories of
consumption. A basic implication of forward-looking consumption behavior is that if a
household receives news about its future income—for instance, that it will be higher than
the household had earlier expected—the household should adjust its current consumption
accordingly in an effort to smooth consumption over time. This implication has been tested
in a couple of different ways.
The most widely used approach has been to test the exclusion restriction, 7 = 0, implied
by forward looking behavior in an equation such as:
A In Chtj = Po + 7^»t,j-i + uhtj
where Yht,j-i is lagged-income (or any variable assumed to be in the household's information
set at time (t,j — 1)), or an equation in which Yhtj is decomposed into an anticipated,
E[Yhtj | flht,j-i]i a n d an unanticipated, rfhtj, component:
AlnChtj = f30 + $jrfm + -fE[Yhtj | Qfaj-i] + uhtj
These excess-sensitivity tests, which provide an indirect test—indirect in that they look for
evidence inconsistent with forward-looking behavior—have been largely motivated by the
fact that whereas empirical proxies for the news that households receive about future income
are difficult to come by, variables, such as lagged income, upon which the excess-sensitivity
tests may be based, are more readily observable.
A different approach, proposed initially by Campbell (1987), has been implemented
using household-level data by Deaton (1992b), Udry (1995), Alessie and Lusardi (1997)
among others. These papers provide direct evidence of forward-looking behavior by testing
whether households save in anticipation of negative shocks to future income. Related are the
excess smoothness tests implemented in papers such as Campbell and Deaton (1989), which
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posit a particular income process and test whether consumption responds to innovations in
income to the extent implied by the theory.
The fact that I am able to construct empirical proxies for the news that households
receive about future income permits me to adopt an approach closer in spirit to the second
one described above.10 The basic equation I estimate is:
l\ in (^htj ~~ /-'0 ' P\ Yhtj i P
which is an estimable version of equation (4.2), where I have, for the present, omitted the
conditional variance term, and have, following the approximation in (4.5), decomposed £htj>
the consumption innovation, into two terms. The second term:
(5.2)
corresponds exactly to the second term in (4.5), and is a proxy for the sum of the news that
the household receives in (t,j) about net cash inflows in future seasons.11 The coefficient,
(32, on this term therefore provides an estimate of the responsiveness of current consumption
to news about future cash inflows. If households are forward-looking and decrease(increase)
their consumption in (t,j) upon receiving news that their future cash inflows are likely to
be lower (higher) than earlier expected, f32 should be positive.
The first term, Yhtj, serves as a proxy for the first term in (4.5); (31 therefore captures,
albeit imprecisely, the response of consumption to news about current realized cash inflows.
I include Yhtj rather than a proxy for just the unanticipated component, as (4.5) suggests,
for purely empirical reasons. Rainfall-related surprises in season j affect both season j
income as well as future incomes, and this is reflected in the construction of the proxies for
news about current and future income. My main concern was that the inclusion of a noisy
measure of the unanticipated shock to season j income might yield a spuriously significant
estimate of /?2—spurious in the sense that it might be really capturing the effect of current
income on current consumption—because the measures of the news about future incomes
are constructed from the same underlying data on season j rainfall surprises. The only
way to avoid this possibility was to include current income, Yhtj, i n the equation. Unless
households are fully insured against income risk, or Yhtj is fully anticipated, /?j should be
positive.
Table (5a) presents the results from estimation of (5.1). The first column reports the
estimates obtained from the full sample. The results provide weak evidence that house-
holds do engage in forward-looking consumption smoothing behavior. The estimate of (3%
is positive and, with a t-statistic of 1.703, is marginally significant (at the 10% level).12 At
the average consumption level during the monsoon season, Rs.1260, the point estimate of
10
 To follow the second approach exactly, I would need to observe savings on a seasonal basis. However, the
ICRISAT data only record changes in asset-holdings from year to year, and thus only provide an independent
measure of annual savings . A measure of seasonal savings can, of course, be imputed from the available
seasonal consumption and income data. But doing so would, if incomes are measured with error, raise
concerns about spurious correlations between income and savings.
The proxies are constructed according to (4.6).
12
 All the statistics reported in Table (6) are based on standard errors that have been corrected for the
presence of generated regressors in the estimated equation.
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0.0000091 implies a marginal propensity to consume out of expected future income of 0.0115
(=0.0000091x1260). In other words, if rainfall patterns in the monsoon signal that cash
inflows in the remaining two seasons are likely to be Rs.2752 higher than earlier expected,
households increase their monsoon season consumption by Rs.31 (=0.0115x2752).13 With-
out a closed form expression for consumption growth, I cannot say whether this response
matches that predicted by theory. But a rough calculation based on the permanent income
model, for which closed form expressions are available, suggests that the estimated response
is low. Under a strict permanent income model, and assuming a stationary income process,
the marginal propensity to consume out of innovations to one-period-ahead income is given
by n+r)3 w n e r e r is the interest rate. The estimated marginal propensity to consume, when
matched to this expression, yields an implied interest rate of just over 1%. This is much
lower than the interest rates observed in the villages in my sample, which are sometimes as
high as 30% from season to season.
The low estimate of /?2 might be explained by a number of factors. The first is the
fact that it was obtained using an estimate of news about future cash inflows that was
not discounted (see (5.2)). I therefore re-estimated (5.1), replacing (5.2) with a discounted
sum calculated under different assumptions about the level as well as the extent of seasonal
variation in the interest rate r. With interest rates in the range generally reported in the
three villages, the estimates of /?2 increase very slightly relative to the base case reported
in the first column of Table (5a), but still remain low. I do not therefore report these
estimates.
A second possible explanation for the low estimate of j32 is that the estimate of news I use
is a poor proxy for the "theoretically correct" measure of news. Note that I am not referring
here to the attenuation bias in small samples from the use of generated regressors—though
that too may be a problem—rather, my concern is that the approximation, (4.5), that I
used to motivate the empirical specification may be inappropriate. There is, however, little
that I can do to address this concern.
I turn therefore to a third possible explanation, and that is the influence of binding
borrowing constraints. Even if forward-looking households wish to smooth consumption in
response to news of future income, with binding borrowing constraints, their capacity to
do so may be limited. And this would dampen the response of consumption to news about
future income.
I explore this possibility in two ways. First, I split the sample on the basis of observed
wealth at the beginning of the panel and re-estimate equation (5.1) separately on each of
the two sub-samples. The basic idea behind the approach is this. Survey and anecdotal
evidence from the sample villages suggest that borrowing opportunities are largely shaped
by wealth, with the wealthier cultivating households enjoying what effectively resembles an
open line of credit from local moneylenders, and in some instances, greater access to loans
from institutional sources. If the presence of binding borrowing constraints does partially
explain the weak response to news about future cashflows observed in the sample as a whole,
given the greater access to credit apparently enjoyed by wealthier households, the estimated
response should be stronger among these households than it is among the poorer households.
13For the sample as a whole, Rs.2752 represents 32% of the average net cash inflows during the winter and
summer seasons combined; 0.32 is the cross-sectional average of the intertemporal coefficient of variation of
combined net cash inflows in these two seasons.
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On the other hand, if the estimated response, though low, is spurious—for instance, because
the estimate of news about future cashflows is constructed from variables that also influence
cashflows in (t,j), it may simply be picking up the response of consumption to concurrent
realized cash inflows14—the estimates of (32 should not differ significantly in the two sub-
samples.
This 'split-sample' approach closely resembles that pursued by, among others, Zeldes(1989),
and using these same data, Morduch(1990). But while those papers use this approach to
investigate whether borrowing constraints help explain the excess-sensitivity of consump-
tion growth to lagged income, I use it to clarify the interpretation of what is essentially an
excess-smoothness finding. The distinction is important. To see why, consider the finding
of Zeldes(1989) that, upon splitting his sample on the basis of wealth, the excess-sensitivity
result disappears for wealthy households, but remains for poor households, for whom con-
sumption growth remains significantly negatively correlated with lagged income. Using
an argument similar to the one laid out above, Zeldes (1989) suggests that this finding
is indicative of borrowing constraints. But as Carroll(1997) very persuasivly argues, this
finding is, in principle, also consistent with precautionary saving behavior in the absence
of borrowing constraints.15 The main advantage of the test I propose is that a finding that
wealthy households respond more to news about future income cannot be explained in terms
of precautionary savings motives. In principle, therefore, the split-sample approach applied
in this context provides a cleaner test of borrowing constraints.
The results reported in the second and third columns of Table (5a) provide support
for the hypothesis of borrowing constraints. The estimate of /32 for the sub-sample of
wealthy households is positive and significant. At the mean monsoon consumption level
for wealthy households, the point estimate, 0.0000145—which, while still low, is nearly
50% larger than the estimate for the sample as a whole—implies a marginal propensity
to consume of 0.025. For the sample of poor households, on the other hand, the estimate
of 02 is actually negative, though statistically insignificant. Moreover, the consumption of
poor households is much more sensitive to realized cashflows (which are at least partially
anticipated) than is that of wealthy households. This too suggests the presence of borrowing
constraints since it may reflect excess sensitivity to anticipated cash inflows. I also test
whether the apparent differences in the estimated coefficients across the two sub-samples
are statistically significant. The second panel of Table (5a) reports the relevant F-test
statistics and associated p-values. The difference in the estimates of f31 is statistically
significant (p-value of 0.029). However, given the large standard error on the estimate of
/?2 for the sub-sample of poor households, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimates
are equal across the two sub-samples.
Splitting the sample on the basis of observed wealth offers a way of testing for forward
looking behavior in the presence of borrowing constraints. It does not, however, exploit a
14Though, as noted above, the presence of Yhtj in the estimated equation makes this unlikely, it is never-
theless possible, especially if Yhtj is grossly mismeasured.
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 The intuition behind this claim is this. With precautionary savings motives, consumption growth will be
positively correlated with the variance of consumption. The variance of consumption will in turn be higher
for poorer households and households with low incomes, who have fewer assets to buffer their consumption
from income shocks. Hence, consumption growth will be negatively correlated with lagged income, and
especially so for poorer households.
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key aspect of optimal consumption behavior under borrowing constraints, which is that the
response to news about future cashflows is potentially asymmetric. The intuition behind
this is simple. Borrowing constraints, when they bind, do so in only one direction—they
prevent households from consuming as much as they would like in a given period. Without
restrictions on savings, and these seem unlikely in any setting, households are always free
to adjust their consumption downward in response to bad news. Therefore, in the presence
of borrowing constraints, the (downward) response of consumption to bad news should
be much stronger than the (upward) adjustment in the face of good news. This suggests a
testing strategy based on splitting the sample into one where households have received good
news and another where they have received bad news.16 Without closed form solutions to
the optimal consumption policy functions, the specific criterion used to split the sample is
necessarily ad-hoc. I chose to split the sample based on the sign of the estimate of news
about future income and re-estimated equation (5.1) separately for each of the sub-samples.
The first column of Table (5b) reports the results from this exercise. These results also
provide evidence in favor of both forward-looking behavior and the hypothesis of borrowing
constraints. The response of household consumption to good news (i.e., T1]i>jf}htj > 0)
is statistically insignificant; on the other hand, the results indicate that when households
receive bad news—i.e., revise downwards their expectations of future cash inflows—they
also reduce their current consumption.17 This can be seen from the point estimate of /32
for the sub-sample of observations where Y^kyjfj^j < 0; the estimate, 0.0000214, is, with
a ^-statistic of 2.578, statistically significant, and is more than double the estimate for the
combined sample (0.0000091), and is larger also than the estimate for the sample of wealthy
households. Moreover, the difference in the estimates of /32 from the two sub-samples is
statistically significant (see the bottom row of the first column).
The two approaches I adopt above in splitting the sample are not mutually exclusive
and a natural next step is to combine the two. I therefore re-estimated equation (5.1)
separately on the sub-samples split by wealth, but allowed both /31 and (32 to vary in each
sub-sample based on whether the households received good news or bad news. The second
and third columns of Table (5b) reports the results I obtained. Again, the results are
consistent with both forward-looking behavior and borrowing constraints in that even poor
households do seem to adjust their consumption downwards in the face of bad news, while
the consumption of wealthy households is responsive to both good and bad news. At this
level of disaggregation, though, the estimated responses are not significant.
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 Again, there is a precedent for this strategy. It is similar to that adopted by Altonji and Siow(1987), but
that paper implements it to clarify an excess sensitivity finding while I use it to modify an excess-smoothness
test. This difference is reflected in the different predictions about the direction of the asymmetry. In Altonji
and Siow(1987), the presence of liquidity constraints implies that consumption should grow more in response
to positive anticipated income changes than it falls in response to negative anticipated income changes.
17These results could, in principle, also be consistent with precautionary savings motives without borrowing
constraints. Carroll and Kimball(1996) show that for a large class of utility functions, the presence of a
precautionary motive implies that consumption is a concave function of wealth. That in turn would imply
that the increase in consumption from an increase in wealth should be smaller (in absolute value) than the
decrease in consumption from an equivalent (in absolute value) decrease in wealth. The asymmetric response
of consumption to good and bad news may reflect this concavity.
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6. Do households engage in precautionary saving?
To test for precautionary saving I estimate:
j = A) + P^htj + /?2Pfc>Al + Ps^ViLtj I flwj-i) + uhtj (6.1)
which is simply equation (5.1) with an added variable—an estimate of the conditional
variance of the news. If households engage in precautionary saving, which implies that
consumption growth should be greatest going into periods where the most uncertainty is
resolved, and for households who face the most uncertainty, (33 should be positive and
significant. A variant of this equation has provided the basis for most prior tests of pre-
cautionary saving. The precautionary savings parameter, /53, has, in most of these studies,
been identified solely from cross-sectional variation in the measure of uncertainty, which
itself has generally been constructed from time-series data on individual incomes. But this
raises the possibility that these measures will be correlated with unobserved cross-sectional
variation in attitudes towards risk—for instance, relatively more risk-averse individuals
may choose professions that offer relatively more stable income streams. As Carroll(1997)
demonstrates, this possibility reduces the usefulness of an equation such as (6.1) as a ba-
sis for tests of precautionary saving, except in situations where there is an observable and
exogenous source of risk that varies across households and/or over time periods. The basic
message of this paper has been that in a poor, agrarian economy, rainfall variation provides
just such a source. And this is reflected in the fact that there are three sources of variation
in ]nV(£htj | Qhtj-i)—cross-sectional, year-to-year, and inter-seasonal—all of which are
plausibly orthogonal to variations in risk preferences.
The first column of Table (6a) reports the results from estimation of equation (6.1)
on the combined sample of households. The estimates of j31 and (32 are similar to those
reported earlier. However, the estimate of /33, which should be positive and significant if
households engage in precautionary savings, is neither.
As before, a possible explanation for this result may be the presence of borrowing con-
straints. But note that whereas the test of forward looking behavior based on (5.1) is
complicated by the possibility of a binding borrowing constraint in (t,j), the test of pre-
cautionary saving is complicated by the possibility of binding borrowing constraints in
(t, j' — 1). This is because, as Deaton(1991) shows, in the presence of borrowing constraints,
the marginal utility of consumption, and hence consumption itself, follows a threshold au-
toregression. A binding borrowing constraint in (t,j — 1) delinks consumption in (t,j) from
consumption in (t,j — 1). Equation (4.2) is, then, no longer an appropriate representation
of consumption growth.
Despite this difference, splitting the sample on the basis of observed wealth again offers
a way of testing for both borrowing constraints and precautionary saving. I, therefore,
re-estimated equation (6.1) separately on the sub-samples of wealthy and poor households.
The results are reported in the second and third columns of Table (6a). For the sub-sample
of poor households, the estimate of /?3 continues to be statistically insignificant, though
it is now negative. Among wealthy households, however, the response of consumption to
future uncertainty is consistent with precautionary saving behavior. The point estimate of
P3 is statistically significant, and at 0.0422, is quite large. The sample standard deviation
of lnV(£htj | Clhtj-i) among wealthy households is 1.199 in the winter season. A one
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standard deviation increase in this proxy for uncertainty about consumption during the
winter season therefore leads to a 5.0% reduction in consumption during the monsoon
(1.199 x 0.0422 = 0.050). This represents a fairly large adjustment given that, for these
households, average consumption growth between the monsoon and winter seasons is 15%.
Table (6b) report the results I obtained from estimation of the following equation in
which I have added lnC^t,j_i to (6.1):
J-_1 + uhtj (6.2)
The motivation for this specification, which is admittedly ad-hoc, comes from a considera-
tion of the Euler equation (3.3), modified to incorporate a binding borrowing constraint in
period (t, j - 1):
v'iChtj^) = (3[l + rj-^EWhtj) | n/rt.j-1) + tiKj-i (6.3)
Here, /iht j_-± > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint in
(t,j — 1). Assuming a CRRA utility specification, a Taylor expansion of (6.3) analogous to
that used to derive (4.2) yields:
A I n d t j = a + - ln/3[l + r^] + -PV(\nChtj | ft/^j-i) - -<f>(lnCht,j-i) + Chtj (6-4)p z p
where:
When the borrowing constraint is not binding, (f)(\nCfltj_i) = 0, and (6.4) reduces to (4.2).
If it is binding, however, (6.4), and not (4.2), is the correct representation of consumption
growth and the test of precautionary saving should be based on the former equation. The
problem with doing so is that (f)(\nCht,j-i) is unobservable. When empirically implementing
(6.4), I, therefore, substitute l n C ^ j . i in its place— 0(lnC^,j-i) is weakly monotonically
related to \nCht,j-i—and this leads to the specification, (6.2). Intuitively, with a binding
borrowing constraint, the initial empirical specification, (6.1), which is based on (4.2), is
overdifferenced, and to correct for this, we need to introduce a lagged dependent variable
into the equation.
The inclusion of \nChtj-i as an added regressor has a marked effect on the estimate of
f33 for both the sample as a whole as well as for the sub-sample of poor households. For the
sample as a whole, the estimate of /33 goes from a statistically insignificant 0.0007, under
the base specification, to 0.0512 with a t-statistic of 6.657 under (6.2) (see the first column
of Table (6b)). The estimate for the sub-sample of poor households goes from -0.0147
to 0.0293. A one standard deviation (1.316) increase in uncertainty about winter season
consumption therefore depresses consumption in the monsoon season by 3.9%; this, too,
represents a fairly large adjustment given that, on average, consumption grows by 8.0% from
the monsoon season to the winter season for these households. For the wealthy households,
precautionary saving continues to be significant though the estimate of /?3 is slightly lower
than that obtained under the base specification. The difference in the estimates of /33 from
the two sub-samples, which was statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.021) under the
base specification, is no longer so.
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The estimates of /34, the coefficient on lagged consumption, are also of some interest
since, in theory, they can provide some indication of the importance of borrowing con-
straints. For each of the three samples, the coefficient on lagged consumption is negative
and highly significant, which is consistent with the hypothesis of borrowing constraints. I
do not, however, place too much weight on these estimates because they likely suffer from
attenuation bias, given the possibility that consumptions may be measured with error.18
7. Conclusion
Households in poor, agrarian economies often derive their income primarily from rain-
dependent agriculture. This dependence raises the possibility that, from rainfall patterns
early on in the crop-cycle, households accumulate information about future cash inflows
(e.g., harvests) before the cashflows are realized. Using detailed longitudinal data from
three villages in India, this paper explored whether households utilize this information in
the ways suggested by modern consumption theories.
Two hypotheses suggested by these theories are that households are forward-looking in
their consumption behavior and react optimally to the receipt of information; and that in
the face of uncertainty about future incomes, households engage in precautionary saving.
The basic challenge in implementing tests of these hypotheses has been to find empirical
measures of the "news" that households receive, and the uncertainty they face. I show that,
in the villages I study, rainfall patterns provide good proxies from which such measures
might be construct. I exploit this fact to test for precautionary saving and forward-looking
behavior.
I find that precautionary saving and forward-looking behavior do not, by themselves,
fully explain the observed consumption patterns. However, when I explicitly incorporate the
possibility of binding borrowing constraints into the testing strategy, I obtain fairly strong
support for the joint hypothesis of precautionary saving and forward-looking behavior in
the presence of borrowing constraints.
18Ravallion and Chaudhuri(1997) provide evidence that suggests that the consumption data from these
three villages are systematically mismeasured because of under-reporting of consumption of own-produced
cereals and grains, especially by the larger cultivating households.
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Figure 1: Average monthly rainfall (1975-1990)
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Figure 2: Seasonal patterns in income
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Yhtj = current income : 01
^k>jVhtj = estimate of news
about future income : /32
F-test statistics (p-value):
Ho : Pi (wealthy) = /^(poor)
Ho '• @2 (wealthy) = /32(poor)
Table
Dependent variable:
A l n C ^ -
Coefficient estimates (t-statistic):
Yhtj x I ( Z k > j V h t j > ° ) ' P i
~V \/ TfS^ ~ k ^ A\ (DXfltj x -L^ZjkyjT/faj <^  V) . P j
^k>jVhtj x ZCEkyjffhtj > °) : PX
^k>jVhtj x Zi^kyjflhtj < °) : P2
F-test statistics (p-value):
Ho : Pi = h\










































































Yhtj = current income1 : fii
^kyjVhtj = estimate of news1
about future income : /?2
inVhtj = log(estimated
variance of news in (t,j) : J33
F-test statistics (p-value):





Yhtj = current income1 : 0-^
^kyjVhtj = estimate of news1
about future income : ^ 2
lnV^^- = log(estimated
variance of news in (£, j) : f33
\nCht>j-i • P±
i^-test statistics (p-value):


























































Notes, coefficient estimates multiplied by 1000
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